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FINANCIAL REGULATION AND COMPETITION: HOW 
SHARED DATA MAY REDUCE INFORMATION ASYMMETRY 
IN THE BRAZILIAN LENDING MARKET 
Lucas Caminha 
Abstract: This paper (i) evaluates the relevance of information/data in 
the credit markets; (ii) addresses whether competition in the lending mar-
kets can be compatible with (or corrosive to) financial stability; and (iii) 
studies the role of the Central Bank of Brazil as the proper authority to 
foster competition between lenders. The paper concludes that competition 
in the credit market may be well-served by policies that stimulate rivals 
to share data on their products and their customers amongst themselves – 
especially those policies aimed at empowering credit bureaus and the 
open banking initiative. 
Keywords: Data. Competition. Regulation. Central Bank of Brazil. 
Resumo: Esse artigo (i) avalia a relevância de informação/dados no mer-
cado de crédito; (ii) aborda se a competição nos mercados de empréstimo 
pode ser compatível com (ou corrosiva à) estabilidade financeira; e (iii) 
estuda o papel do Banco Central do Brasil como a autoridade adequada 
para fomentar a competição entre instituições de crédito. O artigo conclui 
que a concorrência no mercado de crédito pode ser fomentada por regras 
que estimulem concorrentes a compartilhar dados sobre seus produtos e 
clientes entre si – especialmente regras visando empoderar bureaus de 
crédito e a iniciativa de open banking. 
Palavras-chave: Dados. Competição. Regulação. Banco Central do Bra-
sil. 
1. The importance of data for credit competitors: a breach through 
information asymmetry 
When a financial institution cannot perfectly glimpse the finan-
cial information behind a customer who wants to borrow a loan (that is, 
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in almost any case in the real world, since a borrower always knows more 
about their own financial health than the bank does)1, there is information 
asymmetry: a concept first demonstrated by George Akerlof as a market 
failure inherent to the economy (and treated today as one of the founda-
tions of economic literature)2. 
Information asymmetry is a very real issue in the credit markets, 
and, notwithstanding, credit institutions still need financial information 
about borrowers to determine their risk of default, i.e., risk of the bor-
rower not paying their loan on its maturity date(s). In accordance to each 
borrower’s risk of default, the lender determines at which rate, volume 
and maturity conditions the loan may be granted – the lower the risk, the 
better the conditions that the credit institution generally offers. 
However, traditionally, consumers’ financial information and 
credit history are held only by the banks with whom they had a previous 
relationship. In other words, financial institutions institution acquire in-
formation on consumers through relationship banking, and, as the rela-
tionship grows, so does the backlog of banking operations between them 
 
1 Credit Scoring Knowledge Guide. International Finance Corporation (IFC), 2012, 
p. 4. 
2 Conceptually, as Akerlof analyzed, there are many markets where the buyer eva-
luates the statistics to decide whether to buy a product. In these statistics, the proba-
bility of a product being of a lower quality than claimed by the seller is considered. 
In other words, if the market for a certain product has many “lying” sellers, and it is 
not possible to verify the product quality 100% before purchase, buyers may decide 
that the risk of buying a product with hidden defects is high in that market and that 
you shouldn't buy it. To illustrate the concept, Akerlof describes an example that has 
become famous in the literature, which is the used car market. In this market, there 
are used cars that work well and there are used cars that work poorly, the latter called 
“lemons”. Anyone who buys a used car does so without knowing if it is good or if it 
is, secretly, a lemon. It then becomes a matter of probability, as the consumer cannot 
verify at the time of purchase whether the car is good or not, he will decide to buy if 
the risk of the product being a lemon is low. The buyer is forced to make this hidden 
defect risk assessment because the seller of the product has more information about 
the product than the buyer, including whether or not the product is a lemon. It was 
this data gap between two economic agents that George Akerlof called information 
asymmetry. In AKERLOF, George A. The Market for "Lemons": quality uncertainty 
and the market mechanism. Quarterly Journal of Economics, Vol. 84, No. 3, Cam-
bridge: August 1970, pp. 488-500. 
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(account movements, deposits, past loans etc.). As such, credit competi-
tors outside big banks (namely entrants and small/medium financial in-
stitutions) suffer from relevant information asymmetry – high enough to 
be considered a barrier to entry and to expand operations. 
In a scenario where data on financial customers is only held by 
the bank in which they are clients (usually no more than one bank), two 
competition-relevant effects take place: (i) this single bank shall be the 
only institution to have the necessary subsidies to determine its client’s 
risk of default, and, in turn, to adequately determine which conditions to 
impose on a loan for that customer (interest rates, total volume and ma-
turity dates); and (ii) in a grand scale, each bank has an ex post monopoly 
on its own customers' financial data – in other words, they alone hold the 
information that would be required by other financial institutions to ade-
quately offer loans to their customer. 
The practical result of the ex post monopoly on data is that low-
risk borrowers are likely to receive advantageous loan conditions from 
their banks. High-risk borrowers, on the other hand, will not – as a result, 
they will try to gain better loan conditions from entrants/competitors that 
do not hold sufficient data to adequately price out the risk these “bad” 
borrowers represent3. In other words, credit institutions which lack suffi-
cient data will not have enough data to distinguish "good" borrowers from 
"bad" borrowers as readily as incumbent banks, and, as such, might be 
exposed to a larger risk of default (thus increasing its so-called “custos de 
inadimplência”, which are partially responsible for the high interest rates 
 
3 See (1) the vote by Cade commissioner Cristiane Alkmin Junqueira Schmidt in the 
Concentration Act no. 08700.02792/2016-47, which approved with restrictions the 
joint venture of Itaú Unibanco, Bradesco, Santander, Banco do Brasil and CEF to 
establish a credit bureau (called “Quod”), on November 14th, 2016; (2) the vote by 
Cade commissioner César Mattos in Concentration Act no. 08012.011736/2008-41, 
which approved the acquisition of Banco Nossa Caixa by Banco do Brasil on August 
4th, 2010; and (3) VIVES, Xavier. Competition and Stability in Banking: the role of 
Regulation and competition policy. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2016, p. 
75-76. 
REVISTA DO REVISTA DO IBRAC Número 1 - 2021 
96 
in the Brazilian lending market)4. This the phenomenon of adverse selec-
tion, also explained by Akerlof as a consequence of informational asym-
metry in his work on the “lemon” market. 
As constantly evangelized by competition agencies, prudential 
authorities, and academics over the world, and as we ultimately defend 
on this paper, the best course of action to reduce information asymmetry 
effects on credit markets is to determine financial institutions to share 
amongst themselves the data they hold over their customers5. Though not 
exactly a new recommendation, data sharing in the lending markets is 
currently receiving relevant technology and regulatory incentives all over 
the world. From a technological point of view, the ongoing “digitization” 
of credit markets generates increasingly more standardized/marketable 
data, dubbed hard information (as opposed to soft information, which is 
information gained merely through relationship banking). From a regula-
tory point of view, financial authorities may determine that incumbents 
must share the financial data they have on their clients through spe-
cific/secure channels. 
Data sharing among lenders enforces the competitive process 
and generates consumer welfare, since it is able to foster (i) erosion of the 
ex post monopoly of incumbents over their clients’ data, reducing the bar-
rier to entry imposed by information asymmetry; (ii) competition between 
the incumbent banks themselves, instigating them to compete over the 
best clients they garnered over the decades; and (iii) disciplinary effect 
over credit consumers, allowing for reductions in the costs of default cur-
rently composing interest rates6. It has been demonstrated that countries 
 
4 CENTRAL BANK OF BRAZIL. Report on Banking Economy 2018, published in 
May 2019, p. 80. 
5 Entrants who have access to information sources on borrowers are able to compete 
for the best clients of the incumbent banks, in addition to mitigating their portfolio 
risks, transaction costs, and expanding the credit offer to low risk borrowers (inclu-
ding individuals and SMEs) companies not fully served by the traditional banking 
system. In Credit Scoring Knowledge Guide. International Finance Corporation 
(IFC), 2012, p. 5. 
6 See (1) VIVES, Xavier. Competition and Stability in Banking: the role of Regula-
tion and competition policy. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2016, p. 19; (2) 
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in which such data sharing took place between banks stimulated reduc-
tions in local interest rates (a reduction which would be welcome in Bra-
zil)7. Moreover, in the wake of the so-called “digital revolution”, data it-
self has become the one of the world’s most valuable resources8. 
In this paper, we defend that the Central Bank of Brazil is the 
best suited authority to compel incumbent institutions to share their data 
on financial consumers, thus stimulating competitive pressure from inno-
vative entrants in the Brazilian lending market. 
2. The role of financial regulation in stimulating competition in the 
credit markets 
Before demonstrating how effective might be a pro-competition 
stance from the Central Bank of Brazil, we should first decide whether it 
would desirable from a systemic point of view – in other words, if pru-
dential regulation that favors competition between financial institutions 
might jeopardize stability and facilitate banking crises. Since we aim to 
address the potentially positive effects of competition in the credit mar-
ket, the preliminary debate on stability may not be turned away from, less 
we leave this paper open to criticism. Therefore, even if it is not the cen-
tral scope of our work, and in order to avoid our final remarks to be taken 
with a grain of salt (cum grano salis), we briefly set forth certain consid-
erations about competition’s potential harm to innovation. 
Historically, academia has adopted the traditional view that 
bank competition fragilizes the financial system; and, as such, pro-com-
petition policies should not be implemented in the banking 
 
ORNELAS; José Renato Haas, SILVA, Marcos Soares; VAN DOORNIK, Bernar-
dus. Informational Switching Costs, Bank Competition and the Cost of Finance. 
Working Paper Series no. 512. Brasília: Central Bank of Brazil, January 2020, p. 45; 
e (3) GOLDMAN SACHS. Future of Finance Fintech’s Brazil Moment. Goldman 
Sachs Global Investment Research, 2017, p. 28. 
7 GOLDMAN SACHS. Future of Finance Fintech’s Brazil Moment. Goldman Sachs 
Global Investment Research, 2017, p. 28. 
8 THE ECONOMIST. The world’s most valuable resource is no longer oil, but data. 
The Economist (May 6th, 2017). 
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environments9. Most recently, such classic view has been strengthened in 
the wake of the financial crisis from 200810. However, this potentially 
flawed/superficial premise has been questioned over the years by many 
an author, according to whom a concentrated and low-competition bank-
ing environment is just as toxic from a financial soundness point of view. 
To take sides in this debate, one must first understand why bank-
ing stability is (correctly) such a delicate matter and so worthy of concern. 
The financial intermediation activity – i.e., lending and deposits – gener-
ates two relevant impacts in macroeconomy and monetary policy. First, 
the “banking multiplier” phenomenon – banking activity stirs an effect 
equal to generating more currency in the economy, since the banking in-
stitution receives a deposit and generally lends it away (the bank ceases 
to possess said deposit), but, at the same time, the depositor still holds the 
deposited value against the bank with short-term liquidity11. In other 
words, such amount exists in duplicity – both as a liability before the de-
positor as an asset against the borrower. One can see how that might gen-
erate a problem if the depositor decides to withdraw his deposit (as we 
shall see below). 
The second impact to monetary policy, derived from the first, is 
the banks’ ability of “maturity transformation”. Deposits and loans do not 
have matched maturity dates. Deposits generally represent short-term 
debt or on-demand debt (like checking accounts), whereas loans gener-
ally represent comparatively long-term debt12. The resulting maturity 
mismatch, as it is called, renders depositary institutions extremely 
 
9 YAZBEK, Otávio. Regulação do Mercado Financeiro e de Capitais. Rio de Ja-
neiro: Elsevier, 2007, p. 185. 
10 THE ECONOMIST. Deliver us from competition. The Economist (June 25th, 
2009). 
11 YAZBEK, Otávio. Regulação do Mercado Financeiro e de Capitais, op. cit., p. 
75. 
12 DRECHSLER, Itamar; SAVOV, Alexi; SCHNABL, Philipp. Banking on Depo-
sits: maturity transformation without interest rate risk. National Bureau of Economic 
Research, New York University Stern School of Business, 2018, p. 1. 
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vulnerable to liquidity chocks. As such, banks are fragile by default and 
generate severe social costs if they ultimately fail13. 
As a result from these two impacts, financial institutions live 
permanently exposed to the risk of suffering a sudden and unexpected 
liquidity demand by its depositors, which may result in devastating 
consequences. The bank may, for instance, be forced to sell its assets 
at extremely low costs to generate emergency liquidity (fire sales), or, 
if the local prudential authority believes it to be on the verge of causing 
a systemic collapse, suffer an intervention or forced liquidation14. 
These liquidity crises set forth by multiple depositor requests, 
and generally motivated by a negative view regarding the bank’s fi-
nancial health, are the (in)famous bank runs. The most recent theories 
indicate that bank runs are driven by (i) insolvency-related problems 
turned public (which represent actually material deficiencies in its bal-
ance sheet); and/or (ii) liquidity-related problems derived from coor-
dinated actions between depositors, whom, motivated by panic (“herd 
behavior”), see other depositors withdrawing funds from the bank and 
join the fray15. 
Adding to the banking system’s roots of fragility, there is a 
very dense degree of interconnectedness between financial institutions 
in the modern world. Most banks operate loans and deposits between 
themselves16. When one of these institutions suffers an intervention or 
liquidation, the effects of this failure go well beyond the institution’s 
own private sphere and reverberate throughout the financial web all 
 
13 YAZBEK, Otávio. Regulação do Mercado Financeiro e de Capitais, op. cit., p. 
176. 
14 VIVES, Xavier. Competition and Stability in Banking: the role of Regulation and 
competition policy. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2016, p. 38. 
15 Id, p. 39. 
16 CARLETTI, Elena; SMOLENSKA, Agniezka. 10 years on from the Financial 
Crisis: cooperation between competition agencies and regulators in the financial sec-
tor. OCDE, Directorate for Financial and Enterprise Affairs, Competition Commit-
tee. Paris, OECD, 2017, p. 9. 
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the way to the other end – especially to creditor banks (a contamination 
effect). Due to the recent advancements in financial technology, such 
problems of interconnectedness have been exponentially aggravated 
by allowing banks from different regions and countries to access each 
other with progressively less operational and informational hurdles. 
All in all, technology has elevated the risk of contagion by bank fail-
ures, since now there are more transmission lines between financial 
institutions than ever17. 
Considering such propensity to failure, it is not surprising that 
financial systems around the world have been the stage of symptomatic 
and devastating crises. Most recent of those was the crisis of 2008, which 
was originated in the United States from the (i) negligent issuance of de-
rivatives with underlying risky mortgages – the so-called “subprimes”; 
(ii) agency ratings that appointed these asset as low-risk and high grade, 
notwithstanding the actually elevated risks; (iii) progressive deregulation 
in the financial system as a tool to stimulate economic growth18; and (iv) 
politic incentives on both democrats and republicans to, without duly cau-
tion, expand real estate credit as a tool to win over voters19. After being 
born in the United States, the crisis of 2008 reaped across most of the 
world, breaking some banks (emblematic case of Lehman Brothers) and 
driving others to be bailed out by taxpayer’s money. 
After the destruction suffered by the global economy in the cri-
sis’ wake, the role of financial regulation has since returned to the spot-
light, reinvigorating prudential authorities as responsible for adjusting 
market failures in the highly-interconnected, technology-driven financial 
 
17 See (1) YAZBEK, Otávio. Regulação do Mercado Financeiro e de Capitais, op. 
cit., p. 175; and (2) VIVES, Xavier. Competition and Stability in Banking: the role 
of Regulation and competition policy. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2016, 
p. 15. 
18 GERDING, Erik. Bank Regulation and Securitization: how the Law improved 
transmission lines between real estate and banking crises. Georgia Law Review, vol. 
50:1. Atenas, University of Georgia, 2015. 
19 VIVES, Xavier. Competition and Stability in Banking: the role of Regulation and 
competition policy. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2016, p. 17. 
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systems – especially addressing the social cost generated by failing banks 
(much like social costs derived from environmental damages, nuclear in-
dustry and public health. In other words, financial authorities have be-
come (re)empowered to (i) internalize social costs in the financial insti-
tutions themselves, minimizing the risk of spillovers that damage depos-
itors, creditors and the local economy as a whole20; (ii) aligning the exec-
utives’ incentives to drive away excessive risk-taking; (iii) eliminating 
the negative feedback loop between banking balance sheets and econo-
mies (i.e., preventing banking crises from becoming economic crises)21; 
and, specifically addressing the subprimes problems from 2008, eliminat-
ing the transmission lines between bank markets and real estate markets22. 
2.1. Addressing the preliminary issue: does innovative competition harm 
financial stability? 
As previously stated, some fear that the competition process 
weakens banks, atomizes financial institutions, and generates incentives 
for them to take more risks with the objective to succeed against their 
many rivals23. 
Notwithstanding such opinions, the reality is that is high degrees 
of concentration and market power in the banking system are also 
 
20 YAZBEK, Otávio. Regulação do Mercado Financeiro e de Capitais, op. cit., p. 
176. 
21 CARLETTI, Elena; SMOLENSKA, Agniezka. 10 years on from the Financial 
Crisis: cooperation between competition agencies and regulators in the financial sec-
tor. OCDE, Directorate for Financial and Enterprise Affairs, Competition Commit-
tee. Paris, OECD, 2017, p. 7. 
22 GERDING, Erik. Bank Regulation and Securitization: how the Law improved 
transmission lines between real estate and banking crises. Georgia Law Review, vol. 
50:1. Atenas, University of Georgia, 2015. 
23 According to Otávio Yazbek himself, competition and repression against mono-
polies should not be primary concerns in the financial markets, since these goals 
would come at the cost of soundness. In YAZBEK, Otávio. Regulação do Mercado 
Financeiro e de Capitais. Rio de Janeiro: Elsevier, 2007, p. 184-185. 
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extremely prone to systemic risk24. Big banks with market power may (i) 
become “too big to fail”, generating incentives for excessive risk-taking 
due to the explicit and implicit guarantees by the government (that they 
will be bailed out in case of a failure); (ii) build complex structures that 
difficult monitoring and regulating; (iii) employ market-based activities 
(those not reliant on loans and deposits, such as trading) on a greater risk 
basis25. As such, the benefits brought on by more competition in the fi-
nancial sector should not be ignored for prudential stability in of itself, 
since the absence of competition is just as capable of inviting systemic 
disaster. Professor Rory Van Loo sums up the issue26: 
Future crises are unpredictable. The main point is that competition 
policy can be a valuable ally for financial stability in the fintech era. 
Ignoring competition policy can lead to missed opportunities for re-
ducing familiar risks in the short term and can create new threats in 
the long term. 
As a result of this more modern view of competition and pru-
dential regulation as allies, most prudential and competition authorities 
nowadays are readdressing their previous misconceptions and stimulating 
rivalry in their banking systems27. In 2015, the Bank for International 
 
24 See (1) FINANCIAL STABILITY BOARD. Fintech and Market structure in fi-
nancial services: market developments and potential financial stability implications 
(publicado em 14.02.2017), p. 4; and (2) CARLETTI, Elena; SMOLENSKA, Ag-
niezka. 10 years on from the Financial Crisis: cooperation between competition 
agencies and regulators in the financial sector. OCDE, Directorate for Financial and 
Enterprise Affairs, Competition Committee. Paris, OECD, 2017, p. 10-11. 
25 VIVES, Xavier. Competition and Stability in Banking: the role of Regulation and 
competition policy. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2016, p. 118-119. 
26 VAN LOO, Rory. Making Innovation More Competitive: the case of fintech. 
U.C.L.A. Law Review, vol. 65, 2018, p. 232-279. Los Angeles: U.C.L.A., p. 260. 
27 A few examples are in order. First, the Central Bank of Brazil’s own new, pro-
competitive stance, which is studied in Chapter 3.2. Second, in the United Kingdom, 
the Financial Services and Markets Act, 2000 determines that the Prudential Regu-
lation Authority (PRA) must promote financial competition while performing its 
main regulatory functions27. In practice, this has been translated into policies from 
the English prudential authority to reduce barriers to entry and design of proportional 
regimes (i.e., a program called “New Bank Startup Unit” designed to ease entrants 
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Settlements questioned prudential authorities in 33 jurisdictions and con-
cluded that approximately: (i) 8 authorities consulted the competitive 
agency before granting an operating license; (ii) 16 authorities consulted 
the competition agency during the development of standards; (iii) 9 au-
thorities consulted the competitive agency before intervening in a finan-
cial institution; and (iv) 11 authorities shared complaints and market stud-
ies with the competitive agency28. 
To sum up this digression, we believe there are enough argu-
ments to support that an optimum degree of competition in the financial 
system may be reached to promote consumer welfare, all the while still 
preserving stability and soundness. As such, we rely on the premise that 
incremental increases in the Brazilian credit market’s competition do not 
represent relevant systemic risk – and this applies to competition brought 
on by innovative technology and shared data. 
2.2. Why the Central Bank of Brazil should (continue to) promote 
competition 
Having established the premise that stimulating competition in the 
Brazilian credit market would not expose it relevant systemic risk, we 
now proceed to argue why such initiatives should be (and are being) led 
by none other than the Central Bank of Brazil, with special attention to 
data sharing. 
 
into the financial market). Third, reflecting the German central bank’s stance on the 
subject around 2019, a director from Deutsche Bundesbank publicly defended the 
benefits of competition and cooperation between incumbent and incoming banks in 
Germany, while also stressing the need to ensure fair competition in the sector. See 
(1) BASEL COMMITTEE ON BANKING SUPERVISION. Range of practice in 
the regulation and supervision of institutions relevant to financial inclusion. Bank 
for International Settlements (January 2015), p. 25; (2) BALZ, Burkhard. Fintech 
and bigtech firms and central banks – conflicting interests or a common mission? 
German Embassy in Singapura, November 11st, 2019, p. 1; and (3) England’s Chap-
ter 2, section 2.H, Financial Services and Markets Act, 2000. 
28 BASEL COMMITTEE ON BANKING SUPERVISION. Range of practice in the 
regulation and supervision of institutions relevant to financial inclusion. Bank for 
International Settlements (January 2015), p. 25. 
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First of all, spurring competition is a valid way to stimulate re-
ductions in the interest rates in the Brazilian credit market, as pointed out 
during the Introduction. As a general rule, high interest rates have an ef-
fect of (i) incentivizing businesses to reduce investments in economic ac-
tivities, employ fewer personnel and pay lower wages; and (ii) force fam-
ilies to reduce the consumption of goods and services (due to less access 
to credit and aforementioned conditions of unemployment and low 
wages) 29. As such, by employing policies that spur innovative competi-
tion and lower prices, the Central Bank may generate relevant social 
value30. 
In spite of all prudential, economic and social arguments set 
forth in favor of prudential regulation fostering competition, the Central 
Bank did not seem to pay much historical heed to the subject. Rather, the 
Central Bank was created in 1964 through a very pro-concentration pol-
icy (in the context of Law no. 4,595) and has since endured crises which 
have resulted in many failing banks (namely in the 90s, which motivated 
the PROER, PROES and PROEF programs), and constantly plagued by 
fear of competition affecting financial stability. As such, the Central Bank 
did not historically show any relevant concern about competition in the 
 
29 See (1) JOAQUIM, Gustavo; VAN DOORNIK, Bernardus. Bank Competition, 
Cost of Credit and Economic Activity: evidence from Brazil. Working Paper Series 
no. 508. Brasília: Central Bank of Brazil, October 2019; e (2) MIAN, Atif; SUFI, 
Amir; VERNER, Emil. How do Credit Supply Shocks Affect the Real Economy? 
Evidence from the United States in the 1980s. National Bureau for Economic Re-
search. Working Paper No. 23802. Cambridge: NBER, 2017. 
30 As a most notable example, the payments sector has seen a deluge of new innova-
tive entrants like PagSeguro and Stone (movement started on 2012 by Law no. 
12,865, which effectively opened the market to competition) after a lifetime of do-
mination by incumbent banks. Accordingly, the Central Bank issued several regula-
tions aimed to foster competition in this segment, emblematically changing it for the 
better – the market share of entrants in payments grew from 1% to over 28% in the 
last eight years. Prices in the sector have since been reduced by nearly half – all due 
to increased competition and innovation. In WERLANG, Sérgio. Lecture by Sérgio 
Werlang, ex-executive of Economic Policy in Central Bank of Brazil, ex-general exe-
cutive in Itaú Unibanco and professor at Fundação Getúlio Vargas in the event 
“Fintechs e Blockchain: oportunidades para os mercados financeiros”, organized 
by FGV EPGE on November 9th, 2019. 
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credit sector until a few years ago, as seen through the approval of all 
corporate mergers and acquisitions between financial institutions ever 
since 200031. It is quite possible to note that, when one reads the votes in 
which the Central Bank approves two relevant mergers (Bradesco/HSBC 
and Itaú/Citi), the authority clearly showed less concern about competi-
tion effects than Cade when judging the merger32. 
Such historical stance by the Central Bank might lead one to 
believe that it should actually be the Administrative Council for Eco-
nomic Defense (“Cade”) to lead efforts in promoting competition in the 
Brazilian lending market, and not the Central Bank. Indeed, it might seem 
strange to ask for the country’s prudential authority to lead the charge in 
stimulating financial rivalry instead of such country’s competition au-
thority – especially since this is not the case in other countries (i.e., United 
Kingdom). 
However, we do defend that the Central Bank is better institution-
ally positioned than Cade to foster competition in the lending market. We 
are not referring to the historical conflict of competence between both 
authorities (which has already been solved through a Memorandum of 
Understanding signed in 2018)33, but to an issue of institutional design 
(“desenho institucional”). 
 
31 As per answered by Central Bank to our request nº 18600000516201979 under the 
Public Access to Information Law (the “Lei de Acesso à Informação”), on April 
18th, 2019. 
32 See the votes that approved the mergers of Bradesco/HSBC and Itaú/Citi by Cen-
tral Bank – both drafted by executive member Sidnei Corrêa Marques, respectively 
(i) Vote n 263/2015-BCB, December 30th, 2015; and (ii) Vote nº 230/2017-BCB, 
October26th, 2017. 
33 In 2001, a conflict rose between the Central Bank and Cade on which should 
analyze and approve mergers in the financial system. It was around this time that 
Bradesco acquired BCN, and both were fined by Cade for not seeking its approval 
for the merger. This fine was suspended by the Superior Court of Justice on the basis 
that only the Central Bank was in a position to approve or reprove bank mergers, as 
supported by an opinion from the Federal Attorney General’s Office. Cade appealed 
to the Brazilian Supreme Court (Extraordinary Appeal no. 664,189). The lawsuit 
waged on until the dispute was put to rest by a Memorandum of Understanding sig-
ned between the two entities on February 28th, 2018 to settle this historical feud. It 
was agreed upon that the parties of any future merger in the financial system shall 
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Institutionally speaking, Cade has relevant limitations on how 
far it could act to achieve the objective of stimulating competition in the 
lending market. First, its capabilities are effectively reactive: (i) to ap-
prove or reprove mergers that meet the minimum criteria set out in Law 
no. 12,529; (ii) to impose certain obligations in merger agreements that 
can temporarily improve the market, (iii) to repress anticompetitive con-
duct, and (iv) promote competition advocacy in other areas of public pol-
icy. 
The Central Bank, on the other hand, has a much broader man-
date: determining rules that tell financial institutions what they can and 
cannot do – powers derived from Law No. 4,595 (along with the National 
Monetary Council). In other words, the Central Bank's capabilities are 
proactive, and not reactive. Over the last ten years, we have witnessed 
several practical cases of interventions by the Central Bank with the ex-
press objective of correcting market failures (imposing a price limit of 
8% per annum in the overdraft products, intervening in the credit card 
market to limit refinancing, reducing oligopolization in the payroll sector, 
reducing switching costs and lock-in effects through loan portability, and 
others)34. 
Another clear advantage of the Central Bank over Cade is access 
to data. The Central Bank has instant access to the Credit Information 
System (SCR – Sistema de Informações de Crédito), where financial in-
stitutions input all relevant data on past and present loans over R$ 200, 
considering borrower, geographic region, risk level, etc. Cade, on the 
other hand, suffers from an enormous information asymmetry due to not 
having access to data of similar quality, to the point of declaring a meth-
odological inability to analyze data from municipal credit markets during 
 
be required to seek prior approval from both Central Bank and Cade. The Memoran-
dum of Understanding was signed by borth parties on February 28th, 2018, and is 
available at: <https://www.bcb.gov.br/conteudo/home-ptbr/TextosApresenta-
coes/memorando_cade_bc_28022018.pdf>. 
34 CAMINHA, Lucas. Concorrência ou Cooperação entre Bancos e Fintechs no Mer-
cado de Crédito? Uma situação win-win para o bem-estar do consumidor brasileiro. 
Revista do IBRAC, n. 1, 2020, p. 44. 
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concentration acts involving financial institutions35. Considering this ad-
vantage from a data point of view, the Central Bank naturally has more 
subsidies to design regulation that stimulates competition in the credit 
market. 
Therefore, in terms of institutional capacity, the Central Bank is 
in a more strategic position than Cade to encourage competition in the 
credit market. The Central Bank’s authority to edit rules in the sector, 
based on data it has access to as a prudential regulator, allows it to proac-
tively shape the behavior of economic agents – from one day to the next, 
if necessary. Moreover, the Central Bank may contribute to consumer 
welfare not fully protected even by Consumer Law itself, given the law’s 
incapacity to tackle monopoly/oligopoly price distortions (which may 
only be addressed/countered through competition policy36. 
3. How the Central Bank of Brazil should (continue to) promote 
competition 
Adorning the mantle of its institutional role, the Central Bank 
has seemed to have taken up the responsibility of fostering financial com-
petition. Chief among its new strategies was the issuance of Agenda BC+ 
in 2016, which was a list of measures that the Central Bank planned to 
implement in order to improve the financial system. Several of them 
aimed precisely to foster competition, such as structuring positive credit 
scoring bureaus (“cadastro positivo”); segmentation of financial institu-
tions by size37; easing portability and regulatory licenses for credit 
 
35 See the votes from Cade’s Commissioners in Concentration Acts no. 
08700.010790/2015-41 (Bradesco and HSBC), 08700.001642/2017-05 (Itaú and 
Citi), and 08012.009397/2009-14 (Bicbanco and Sul Financeira). 
36 FORGIONI, Paula. Fundamentos do Antitruste. 10th edition. São Paulo: Revista 
dos Tribunais, 2018, p. 257. 
37 The guiding principle of segmentation is proportionality – applying more flexible 
rules for entry and allocation of capital to smaller entrants who do not present syste-
mic risk. For more on segmentation of financial institutions, see (1) Final Report of 
the Parliamentary Committee of Inquiry regarding credit cards (the “Comissão Par-
lamentar de Inquérito dos Cartões de Crédito”. Federal Senate, Brasília, July 2018, 
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fintechs. All of these measures above were effectively implemented by 
the Central Bank (and National Monetary Council) between 2017 and 
2018. 
By 2019, the Central Bank updated its objectives in “Agenda 
BC+” (while also renaming it to “Agenda BC#”, presumably to reflect the 
affinity with technology and innovation), and overall maintaining a pro-
competition spirit. As a result, nowadays, the Central Bank’s proactive 
stance towards fostering competition is openly recognized by officers 
from Cade38, authorities from abroad39, specialized press40, and many a 
public statement by the Central Bank's executive board. Emblematically, 
in 2019, one of its chief executives (João Manoel Pinho de Mello) pub-
licly pointed out four practical measures that the authority aims to imple-
ment in benefit of competition41: (i) legal certainty in the recovery of 
guarantees and less information asymmetry (i.e., positive record); (ii) 
greater vigilance against anticompetitive conduct; (iii) encourage the en-
try of new competitors; and (iv) “ensuring that the market takes advantage 
 
p. 19 and 95; (2) CARLETTI, Elena; SMOLENSKA, Agniezka. 10 years on from 
the Financial Crisis: cooperation between competition agencies and regulators in 
the financial sector. OCDE, Directorate for Financial and Enterprise Affairs, Com-
petition Committee. Paris, OECD, 2017, p. 18. 
38 “In fact, considering other banks, it is worth saying that (...) the regulator has 
been acting more forcefully, namely the Central Bank of Brazil, aiming to resolve 
the various market failures” (free translation). In Vote by Cade commissioner Cris-
tiane Alkmin Junqueira Schmidt in the Concentration Act no. 08700.004431/2017-
16, which voted to forbid the purchase, by Itaú Unibanco, of a minor shareholder 
position in XP Investimentos, on March 14th, 2018. 
39 “The pro-active approach of stimulating new laws and cooperation with other 
countries by the Brazilian Central Bank could potentially help the fintechs to grow 
and change the Brazilian market as a result of more competition”. In SAGOENIE, 
Yashini, SMITS; Petra, BAKKER, Ernst-Jan. Fintech in Brazil. Ministry of Econo-
mic Affairs and Climate Policy of the Netherlands. Hague: Netherlands Enterprise 
Agency, February 2019, p. 5. 
40 GRAY, Kevin, Brazil's central bank policies encourage fintech startups. LatinFi-
nance (March 28, 2019). 
41 João Manoel Pinho de Mello defende maior concorrência no setor bancário. Co-
rreio Braziliense (February 26th, 2019). 
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of the huge pro-competitive opportunities that technological advance-
ment [brings]”. 
3.1. Fostering competition through financial data sharing between 
lenders 
We now turn to how, in the Central Bank’s endeavor to stimu-
late competition, it has decided to attack the barrier to entry formed by 
information asymmetry in order to stimulate competition in the lending 
market. As such, the authority has actively sponsored two initiatives to 
stimulate sharing of data sharing between financial institutions. 
First, the empowerment of credit scoring bureaus, which is still 
how most countries still operationalize sharing of financial hard infor-
mation. We refer to agents specialized in storing and sharing data on fi-
nancial transactions between consumers and credit market institutions 
(and sometimes of other markets, such as public utilities). Each country 
has its own microsystem of credit information, hoarded in databases and 
sustained by a robust institutional design meant to maximize efficiency 
(from a both technological and legal point of view). The very first credit 
bureaus date back to 19th century’s England, but true worldwide consol-
idation of credit scoring systems would only be technologically allowed 
after the second half of the 20th century42. In Brazil, the positive credit 
score bureaus (“cadastro positivo”) were recently reformed by Comple-
mentary Law no. 166 and Resolution no. 4,737. 
Second, the regulatory design of an open banking initiative – the 
sharing and leveraging of customer-permissioned data by banks with 
third-party developers and firms to build applications and services, such 
as those that provide real time payments, greater financial transparency 
options for account holders, and marketing and cross-selling 
 
42 Credit Scoring Knowledge Guide. International Finance Corporation (IFC), 
2012, p. 5. 
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opportunities43. According to recent studies by Ornelas, Silva, and Van 
Doornik, the use of open banking to stimulate data sharing may actively 
improve the local lending market (Working Paper Series of the Central 
Bank of Brazil)44: 
[Policy] responses related to foster information sharing may help to 
decrease switching costs and alleviate the holdup problem. Open 
banking initiatives can make information held by incumbent banks to 
flow towards other financial institutions so that firms can get better 
interest rates by outside banks, thus enhancing competition. Another 
policy initiative is to reduce entry barriers to new competitors, like the 
credit fintechs. These institutions usually have a transactional lending 
approach, instead of relationship banking, so that an open banking in-
itiative can enhance their ability to obtain information about firms and 
provide better loan conditions. 
The open banking initiative is currently the Central Bank’s most 
emblematic structural policy in its efforts to stimulate competition in the 
credit market. Its most visible benchmarks are the first nation to employ 
a relevant open banking initiative: Australia and the United Kingdom45. 
Notwithstanding, not all jurisdictions approach data sharing with the ex-
press intent to impose it. Currently, countries are mostly divided between 
(i) jurisdictions that determine financial institutions to share their data via 
open banking, specifically the European Union, India, Mexico, South 
 
43 BASEL COMMITTEE ON BANKING SUPERVISION. Report on open banking 
and application programming interfaces. Bank for International Settlements, Nove-
mber 2019, p. 19. 
44 ORNELAS; José Renato Haas, SILVA, Marcos Soares; VAN DOORNIK, Ber-
nardus Ferdinandus Nazar. Informational Switching Costs, Bank Competition and 
the Cost of Finance. Working Paper Series no. 512. Brasília: Central Bank of Brazil, 
January 2020, p. 45. 
45 See (1) FINANCIAL STABILITY BOARD. Fintech and Market structure in fi-
nancial services: market developments and potential financial stability implications 
(published in February 14th, 2017), p. 8-9; e (2) CARMONA, Alberto; LOM-
BARDO, Agustín; PASTOR, Rafael; QUIRÓS, Carlota; GARCÍA, Juan; MUÑOZ, 
David; MARTÍN, Luis. Competition issues in the area of financial technology (Fin-
Tech). European Parliament. Policy Department for Economic, Scientific and Qua-
lity of Life Policies. Dictorate-General for Internal Policies, 2018, p. 73. 
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Africa, Thailand, and, as of now, Brazil; (ii) jurisdictions that encourage 
financial institutions to share their data via open banking, specifically 
Hong Kong, Korea and Singapore; (iii) countries that leave sharing at the 
sole discretion of each institution, specifically the United States, China 
and Argentina; and (iv) jurisdictions that are still defining open banking 
rules, specifically Australia, Russia, Turkey and Canada46. 
Considering the relevance of data to financial competition, as 
studied in Chapter 1 and endorsed by Professors José Scheinkman47 and 
Sérgio Werlang48, there is little doubt that open banking holds high po-
tential to improve the competitive process in the Brazilian lending mar-
ket. This potential may lead, consequently, to a reduction in the current 
interest rates and lending spread, much like CMA expects the United 
Kingdom’s open banking system to knock 30% off from English banking 
spread)49. 
In practice, the construction of Brazilian open banking started 
on 2019, when Central Bank issued Statement no. 33,455. From the start, 
this preliminary set of rules already determine that the largest financial 
institutions (namely S1 and S2 categories) shall be forced to share their 
data in the open banking systems as soon as they are implemented. The 
Central Bank’s statement seems to address the concern whether large 
 
46 BASEL COMMITTEE ON BANKING SUPERVISION. Report on open banking 
and application programming interfaces. Bank for International Settlements, Nove-
mber 2019, p. 19. 
47 SCHEINKMAN, José. Lecture by José Scheinkman, professor at Columbia Uni-
versity, at the event “Competição e Inclusão Financeira”, organized by Instituto 
ProPague on August 14th, 2019. 
48 WERLANG. Lecture by Sérgio Werlang, ex-executive of Economic Policy in 
Central Bank of Brazil, ex-general executive in Itaú Unibanco and professor at Fun-
dação Getúlio Vargas, in the event “Fintechs e Blockchain: oportunidades para os 
mercados financeiros”, organized by FGV EPGE on November 9th, 2019. 
49 Indeed, CMA was the responsible authority for coordinating the implementation 
of English open banking – an intuitive premise, considering how the initiative is pro-
competitive in nature. However, in Brazil, it is not Cade that is coordinating the 
implementation of open banking, but the Central Bank itself – further confirming the 
opinion we defend in this paper about how, in the Brazilian institutional design, the 
Central Bank is better positioned than Cade to promote competition in the credit 
market. 
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banks would have incentive to willingly share their precious data on cus-
tomers (thus renouncing their ex post monopoly on such data). 
After Statement no. 33,455, the Central Bank issued Public Con-
sultation no. 73, 2019 with an initial proposal of regulatory structure sur-
rounding open banking. After lengthy discussions with the market on how 
to best implant and regulate it thoroughly, the final rules were finally de-
termined by Joint Resolution no. 1, dated May 2020, issued by both the 
Central Bank and the National Monetary Council. The final version of the 
regulation appointed that Brazilian open banking would mandate finan-
cial institutions to share the following categories of data: 
I - data on: 
a) service channels related to: 1. applied facilities; 2. correspondent in 
the country; 3. electronic channels; and 4. other channels available to 
customers; 
b) products and services related to: 1. demand deposit accounts; 2. de-
posit accounts; 3. prepaid payment accounts; 4. postpaid payment ac-
counts; 5. credit operations; 6. foreign exchange transactions; 7. ac-
creditation services for payment agreements; 8. time deposit accounts 
and other products of an investment nature; 9. insurance; and 10. open 
supplementary pension; 
c) registration of customers and their representatives; and d) customer 
taxes related to: 1. demand deposit accounts; 2. deposit accounts; 3. 
prepaid payment accounts; 4. postpaid payment accounts; 5. credit op-
erations; 6. registration and control account referred to in Resolution 
No. 3,402, of September 6, 2006; 7. foreign exchange transactions; 8. 
accreditation services for payment agreements; time deposit accounts 
and other products of an investment nature; 10. insurance; 11. open 
supplementary pension; and 
II - services of: 
a) initiation of payment transactions; and 
b) submission of a credit operation proposal. 
This robust pool of data is crucial to give new competitors a 
chance to compete in the lending markets, and also to stimulate competi-
tion among the incumbents themselves. By gaining access to the troves 
of data usually hoarded by few banks, all competitors gain the capacity 
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to adequately separate low-risk borrowers from high-risk borrowers, ef-
fectively reducing the barrier to entry that is formed by information asym-
metry between lender and customer. 
Competitors also have an additional synergy opportunity with 
open banking – they may use the shared data to track down low-risk cus-
tomers from other financial institutions and offer them products at more 
advantageous conditions than the ones they are currently receiving. As a 
practical example: if a customer is close to borrowing from an overdraft 
line in their banking institution (“cheque especial”), a competitor may be 
interested to offer them a credit line with lower interest rates, virtually 
taking this customer from the other institution. To that end, each lender 
shall be plugged into the open banking system and be allowed to discover, 
thanks to the constant influx of data, each and every customer opportunity 
such as these. Aware of this growing threat, incumbent banks may also 
employ efforts to please their own customer as a way of keeping them 
from leaving. The net result of this competition, brought on by shared 
data, may yet be overall better conditions for financial consumers in the 
Brazilian lending market. 
4. Conclusions 
On this paper, we have demonstrated how, amidst the competi-
tive process of the Brazilian lending markets, much may be gained from 
regulatory measures designed to stimulate/compel competitors to share 
amongst themselves the data they have on their products and customers. 
The Central Bank of Brazil currently relies on two such initiatives, which 
are to empower credit scoring bureaus, and, most importantly, to structure 
an open banking system interwoven across Brazilian financial institu-
tions. 
If allowed access to good quality data from consumers and prod-
ucts, all competitors in the lending market may leverage such hard infor-
mation in order to (i) screen their potential customers by separating low-
risk borrowers from high-risk borrowers, all based on the information on 
such persons that is shared by other institutions (avoiding the problem of 
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adverse selection); and (ii) identify profitable and low-risk customers 
held by incumbent banks that may be attracted by better conditions of-
fered by other lenders. While merely examples, these possibilities illus-
trate how innovative entrants may compete more efficiently if they are 
allowed to reap the benefits from (regulatory policies determining) shared 
data from other lenders in the Brazilian credit market. 
References 
AKERLOF, George A. The Market for "Lemons": quality uncertainty and 
the market mechanism. Quarterly Journal of Economics, Vol. 84, No. 3, 
Cambridge: August 1970, pp. 488-500. 
ALENCAR, Leonardo; ANDRADE, Rodrigo, BARBOSA, Klenio. Bank 
Competition and the Limits of Creditor’s Protection Reforms. XII Annual 
Seminar on Risk, Financial Stability and Banking. São Paulo: Central 
Bank of Brazil, 2017. 
BALZ, Burkhard. Fintech and bigtech firms and central banks – conflict-
ing interests or a common mission? German Embassy in Singapura, No-
vember 11st, 2019, p. 1. 
BARBOSA, Klênio; ROCHA, Bruno; SALAZAR, Fernando. Assessing 
Competition in Banking Industry: a multiproduct approach. Journal of 
Banking & Finance, vol 50, p.340-362. Amsterdã: Elsevier, January 
2015. 
BASEL COMMITTEE ON BANKING SUPERVISION. Range of prac-
tice in the regulation and supervision of institutions relevant to financial 
inclusion. Bank for International Settlements (January 2015). 
CAMINHA, Lucas. Concorrência ou Cooperação entre Bancos e Finte-
chs no Mercado de Crédito? Uma situação win-win para o bem-estar do 
consumidor brasileiro. Revista do IBRAC, n. 1, 2020. 
CARLETTI, Elena; SMOLENSKA, Agniezka. 10 years on from the Fi-
nancial Crisis: cooperation between competition agencies and regulators 
REVISTA DO REVISTA DO IBRAC Número 1 - 2021 
115 
in the financial sector. OCDE, Directorate for Financial and Enterprise 
Affairs, Competition Committee. Paris, OECD, 2017. 
CARMONA, Alberto; LOMBARDO, Agustín; PASTOR, Rafael; QUI-
RÓS, Carlota; GARCÍA, Juan; MUÑOZ, David; MARTÍN, Luis. Com-
petition issues in the area of financial technology (FinTech). European 
Parliament. Policy Department for Economic, Scientific and Quality of 
Life Policies. Dictorate-General for Internal Policies, 2018. 
CENTRAL BANK OF BRAZIL. Public hearing no. 48/2019 of the Eco-
nomic Matters Commission of the Federal Senate. Institutional presenta-
tion from the Central Bank of Brazil. 
CENTRAL BANK OF BRAZIL. Report on Banking Economy 2018. 
Publish in May 2019. 
Central Bank of Brazil votes that approved the mergers of Brad-
esco/HSBC and Itaú/Citi by Central Bank – both drafted by executive 
member Sidnei Corrêa Marques, respectively (i) Vote n 263/2015-BCB, 
December 30th, 2015; and (ii) Vote nº 230/2017-BCB, October26th, 
2017. 
Credit Scoring Knowledge Guide. International Finance Corporation 
(IFC), 2012. 
DRECHSLER, Itamar; SAVOV, Alexi; SCHNABL, Philipp. Banking on 
Deposits: maturity transformation without interest rate risk. National Bu-
reau of Economic Research, New York University Stern School of Busi-
ness, 2018. 
Final Report of the Parliamentary Committee of Inquiry regarding credit 
cards (the “Comissão Parlamentar de Inquérito dos Cartões de Crédito”. 
Federal Senate, Brasília, July 2018. 
FINANCIAL STABILITY BOARD. Fintech and Market structure in fi-
nancial services: market developments and potential financial stability 
implications (published in February 14th, 2017), p. 21. 
FORGIONI, Paula. Fundamentos do Antitruste. 10ª ed. São Paulo: Re-
vista dos Tribunais, 2018. 
REVISTA DO REVISTA DO IBRAC Número 1 - 2021 
116 
GOLDMAN SACHS. Future of Finance Fintech’s Brazil Moment. Gold-
man Sachs Global Investment Research, 2017. 
GERDING, Erik. Bank Regulation and Securitization: how the Law im-
proved transmission lines between real estate and banking crises. Georgia 
Law Review, vol. 50:1. Atenas, University of Georgia, 2015. 
GRAY, Kevin, Brazil's central bank policies encourage fintech startups. 
LatinFinance (March 28, 2019). 
JENG, Leslie; WELLS, Philippe. The determinants of venture capital 
funding: evidence across countries. Journal of Corporate Finance, v.6. 
Amsterdã: Elsevier, 2000, p. 241-289. 
João Manoel Pinho de Mello defende maior concorrência no setor bancá-
rio. Correio Braziliense (February 26th, 2019). 
JOAQUIM, Gustavo; VAN DOORNIK, Bernardus. Bank Competition, 
Cost of Credit and Economic Activity: evidence from Brazil. Working 
Paper Series no. 508. Brasília: Central Bank of Brazil, October 2019. 
Memorandum of Understanding signed between the Central Bank of Bra-
zil and Cade on February 28th, 2018, as available at: 
<https://www.bcb.gov.br/conteudo/home-ptbr/TextosApresentac-
oes/memorando_cade_bc_28022018.pdf>. 
MIAN, Atif; SUFI, Amir; VERNER, Emil. How do Credit Supply Shocks 
Affect the Real Economy? Evidence from the United States in the 1980s. 
National Bureau for Economic Research. Working Paper No. 23802. 
Cambridge: NBER, 2017. 
ORNELAS; José Renato Haas, SILVA, Marcos Soares; VAN DOOR-
NIK, Bernardus. Informational Switching Costs, Bank Competition and 
the Cost of Finance. Working Paper Series no. 512. Brasília: Banco Cen-
tral do Brasil, January 2020. 
Request nº 18600000516201979 under the Public Access to Information 
Law (the “Lei de Acesso à Informação”), answered by the Central Bank 
of Brazil on April 18th, 2019. 
REVISTA DO REVISTA DO IBRAC Número 1 - 2021 
117 
SAGOENIE, Yashini, SMITS; Petra, BAKKER, Ernst-Jan. Fintech in 
Brazil. Ministry of Economic Affairs and Climate Policy of the Nether-
lands. Hague: Netherlands Enterprise Agency, February 2019. 
SCHEINKMAN, José. Lecture by José Scheinkman, professor at Colum-
bia University, at the event “Competição e Inclusão Financeira”, orga-
nized by Instituto ProPague on August 14th, 2019. 
STANDARD & POOR GLOBAL RATINGS. Ruptura tecnológica nos 
bancos de varejo: bancos brasileiros à altura do desafio (free translation: 
Technology rupture at retail banks: Brazilian banks up to the challenge). 
São Paulo: Standard & Poor's Financial Services LLC, February 2020. 
THE ECONOMIST. Deliver us from competition. The Economist (June 
25th, 2009). 
THE ECONOMIST. The world’s most valuable resource is no longer oil, 
but data. The Economist (May 6th, 2017). 
VAN LOO, Rory. Making Innovation More Competitive: the case of 
fintech. U.C.L.A. Law Review, vol. 65, 2018, p. 232-279. Los Angeles: 
U.C.L.A. 
Vote by Cade commissioner César Mattos in Concentration Act no. 
08012.011736/2008-41, which approved the acquisition of Banco Nossa 
Caixa by Banco do Brasil on August 4th, 2010. 
Vote by Cade commissioner Cristiane Alkmin Junqueira Schmidt in the 
Concentration Act no. 08700.02792/2016-47, which approved with re-
strictions the joint venture of Itaú Unibanco, Bradesco, Santander, Banco 
do Brasil and CEF to establish a credit bureau (called “Quod”), on No-
vember 14th, 2016. 
Vote by Cade commissioner Cristiane Alkmin Junqueira Schmidt in the 
Concentration Act no. 08700.004431/2017-16, which voted to forbid the 
purchase, by Itaú Unibanco, of a minor shareholder position in XP Inves-
timentos, on March 14th, 2018. 
REVISTA DO REVISTA DO IBRAC Número 1 - 2021 
118 
VIVES, Xavier. Competition and Stability in Banking: the role of Regu-
lation and competition policy. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 
2016. 
WERLANG, Sérgio. Lecture by Sérgio Werlang, ex-executive of Eco-
nomic Policy in Central Bank of Brazil, ex-general executive in Itaú Uni-
banco and professor at Fundação Getúlio Vargas, in the event “Fintechs 
e Blockchain: oportunidades para os mercados financeiros”, organized 
by FGV EPGE on November 9th, 2019. 
YAZBEK, Otávio. Regulação do Mercado Financeiro e de Capitais. Rio 
de Janeiro: Elsevier, 2007. 
